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Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy
Over the years, Tom Hoenig and his colleagues at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City have done an excellent job of selecting 
interesting and relevant topics for this annual symposium. I think I 
can safely say that this year they have outdone themselves. Recently, 
the subject of housing finance has preoccupied financial-market par-
ticipants and observers in the United States and around the world. 
The financial turbulence we have seen had its immediate origins in 
the problems in the subprime mortgage market, but the effects have 
been felt in the broader mortgage market and in financial markets 
more generally, with potential consequences for the performance of 
the overall economy.
In my remarks this morning, I will begin with some observations 
about recent market developments and their economic implications. 
I will then try to place recent events in a broader historical context by 
discussing the evolution of housing markets and housing finance in 
the United States. In particular, I will argue that, over the years, in-
stitutional changes in U.S. housing and mortgage markets have sig-
nificantly influenced both the transmission of monetary policy and 
the economy’s cyclical dynamics. As our system of housing finance 
continues to evolve, understanding these linkages not only provides 
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useful insights into the past but also holds the promise of helping us 
better cope with the implications of future developments. 
Recent Developments in Financial Markets and the Economy
I will begin my review of recent developments by discussing the 
housing situation. As you know, the downturn in the housing mar-
ket, which began in the summer of 2005, has been sharp. Sales of 
new and existing homes have declined significantly from their mid-
2005 peaks and have remained slow in recent months. As demand 
has weakened, house prices have decelerated or even declined by 
some measures, and homebuilders have scaled back their construc-
tion of new homes. The cutback in residential construction has di-
rectly reduced the annual rate of U.S. economic growth about  3⁄4 
percentage point on average over the past year and a half. Despite 
the slowdown in construction, the stock of unsold new homes re-
mains quite elevated relative to sales, suggesting that further declines 
in homebuilding are likely. 
The outlook for home sales and construction will also depend on 
unfolding developments in mortgage markets. A substantial increase 
in lending to nonprime borrowers contributed to the bulge in resi-
dential investment in 2004 and 2005, and the tightening of credit 
conditions for these borrowers likely accounts for some of the con-
tinued softening in demand we have seen this year. As I will discuss, 
recent market developments have resulted in additional tightening of 
rates and terms for nonprime borrowers as well as for potential bor-
rowers through “jumbo” mortgages. Obviously, if current conditions 
persist in mortgage markets, the demand for homes could weaken 
further, with possible implications for the broader economy. We are 
following these developments closely.
As  house  prices  have  softened,  and  as  interest  rates  have  risen 
from the low levels of a couple of years ago, we have seen a marked   
deterioration in the performance of nonprime mortgages. The prob-
lems have been most severe for subprime mortgages with adjustable 
rates: The proportion of those loans with serious delinquencies rose 
to about 131⁄2 percent in June, more than double the recent low seen 
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late 2005 and in 2006 have performed the worst, in part because 
of slippage in underwriting standards, reflected for example in high 
loan-to-value  ratios  and  incomplete  documentation.  With  many 
of these borrowers facing their first interest rate resets in coming   
quarters, and with softness in house prices expected to continue to 
impede refinancing, delinquencies among this class of mortgages are 
likely to rise further. Apart from adjustable-rate subprime mortgages, 
however, the deterioration in performance has been less pronounced, 
at least to this point. For subprime mortgages with fixed rather than 
variable rates, for example, serious delinquencies have been fairly 
stable at about 51⁄2 percent. The rate of serious delinquencies on alt-A 
securitized pools rose to nearly 3 percent in June, from a low of less 
than 1 percent in mid-2005. Delinquency rates on prime jumbo 
mortgages have also risen, though they are lower than those for prime 
conforming loans, and both rates are below 1 percent.
Investors’ concerns about mortgage credit performance have inten-
sified sharply in recent weeks, reflecting, among other factors, worries 
about the housing market and the effects of impending interest-rate 
resets on borrowers’ ability to remain current. Credit spreads on new 
securities backed by subprime mortgages, which had jumped earlier 
this year, rose significantly more in July. Issuance of such securities 
has been negligible since then, as dealers have faced difficulties plac-
ing even the AAA-rated tranches. Issuance of securities backed by 
alt-A and prime jumbo mortgages also has fallen sharply, as inves-
tors have evidently become concerned that the losses associated with 
these types of mortgages may be higher than had been expected.
With securitization impaired, some major lenders have announced 
the cancellation of their adjustable-rate subprime lending programs. 
A number of others that specialize in nontraditional mortgages have 
been forced by funding pressures to scale back or close down. Some 
lenders  that  sponsor  asset-backed  commercial  paper  conduits  as 
bridge financing for their mortgage originations have been unable to 
“roll” the maturing paper, forcing them to draw on back-up liquidity 
facilities or to exercise options to extend the maturity of their paper. 
As a result of these developments, borrowers face noticeably tighter 
terms and standards for all but conforming mortgages.4  Ben S. Bernanke
As you know, the financial stress has not been confined to mort-
gage markets. The markets for asset-backed commercial paper and 
for lower-rated unsecured commercial paper also have suffered from 
pronounced declines in investor demand, and the associated flight to 
quality has contributed to surges in the demand for short-dated Trea-
sury bills, pushing T-bill rates down sharply on some days. Swings 
in stock prices have been sharp, with implied price volatilities ris-
ing to about twice the levels seen in the spring. Credit spreads for 
a range of financial instruments have widened, notably for lower-
rated corporate credits. Diminished demand for loans and bonds 
to finance highly leveraged transactions has increased some banks’ 
concerns that they may have to bring significant quantities of these 
instruments onto their balance sheets. These banks, as well as those 
that have committed to serve as back-up facilities to commercial pa-
per programs, have become more protective of their liquidity and 
balance-sheet capacity.         
Although this episode appears to have been triggered largely by 
heightened  concerns  about  subprime  mortgages,  global  financial 
losses have far exceeded even the most pessimistic projections of 
credit losses on those loans. In part, these wider losses likely reflect 
concerns that weakness in U.S. housing will restrain overall econom-
ic growth. But other factors are also at work. Investor uncertainty 
has increased significantly, as the difficulty of evaluating the risks of 
structured products that can be opaque or have complex payoffs has 
become more evident. Also, as in many episodes of financial stress, 
uncertainty about possible forced sales by leveraged participants and 
a higher cost of risk capital seem to have made investors hesitant to 
take advantage of possible buying opportunities. More generally, in-
vestors may have become less willing to assume risk. Some increase in 
the premiums that investors require to take risk is probably a healthy 
development on the whole, as these premiums have been exception-
ally low for some time. However, in this episode, the shift in risk atti-
tudes has interacted with heightened concerns about credit risks and 
uncertainty about how to evaluate those risks to create significant 
market stress. On the positive side of the ledger, we should recog-
nize that past efforts to strengthen capital positions and the financial 
infrastructure place the global financial system in a relatively strong 
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In the statement following its August 7 meeting, the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) recognized that the rise in financial 
volatility and the tightening of credit conditions for some households 
and businesses had increased the downside risks to growth somewhat 
but reiterated that inflation risks remained its predominant policy 
concern. In subsequent days, however, following several events that 
led investors to believe that credit risks might be larger and more 
pervasive than previously thought, the functioning of financial mar-
kets became increasingly impaired. Liquidity dried up and spreads 
widened as many market participants sought to retreat from certain 
types of asset exposures altogether.
Well-functioning financial markets are essential for a prosperous 
economy. As the nation’s central bank, the Federal Reserve seeks to 
promote general financial stability and to help to ensure that finan-
cial markets function in an orderly manner. In response to the devel-
opments in the financial markets in the period following the FOMC 
meeting, the Federal Reserve provided reserves to address unusual 
strains in money markets. On August 17, the Federal Reserve Board 
announced a cut in the discount rate of 50 basis points and adjust-
ments in the Reserve Banks’ usual discount window practices to fa-
cilitate the provision of term financing for as long as thirty days, 
renewable by the borrower. The Federal Reserve also took a number 
of supplemental actions, such as cutting the fee charged for lending 
Treasury securities. The purpose of the discount window actions was 
to assure depositories of the ready availability of a backstop source 
of liquidity. Even if banks find that borrowing from the discount 
window is not immediately necessary, the knowledge that liquidity 
is available should help alleviate concerns about funding that might 
otherwise constrain depositories from extending credit or making 
markets. The Federal Reserve stands ready to take additional actions 
as needed to provide liquidity and promote the orderly functioning 
of markets.
It is not the responsibility of the Federal Reserve—nor would it be 
appropriate—to protect lenders and investors from the consequences 
of their financial decisions. But developments in financial markets 
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and the Federal Reserve must take those effects into account when 
determining policy. In a statement issued simultaneously with the 
discount window announcement, the FOMC indicated that the de-
terioration in financial market conditions and the tightening of cred-
it since its August 7 meeting had appreciably increased the downside 
risks to growth. In particular, the further tightening of credit condi-
tions, if sustained, would increase the risk that the current weakness 
in housing could be deeper or more prolonged than previously ex-
pected, with possible adverse effects on consumer spending and the 
economy more generally.
The incoming data indicate that the economy continued to expand 
at a moderate pace into the summer, despite the sharp correction 
in the housing sector. However, in light of recent financial develop-
ments, economic data bearing on past months or quarters may be less 
useful than usual for our forecasts of economic activity and inflation. 
Consequently, we will pay particularly close attention to the timeli-
est indicators, as well as information gleaned from our business and 
banking contacts around the country. Inevitably, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the outlook will be greater than normal, presenting a chal-
lenge to policymakers to manage the risks to their growth and price 
stability objectives. The Committee continues to monitor the situa-
tion and will act as needed to limit the adverse effects on the broader 
economy that may arise from the disruptions in financial markets.
Beginnings: Mortgage Markets in the Early Twentieth Century
Like us, our predecessors grappled with the economic and policy 
implications of innovations and institutional changes in housing fi-
nance. In the remainder of my remarks, I will try to set the stage for 
this weekend’s conference by discussing the historical evolution of 
the mortgage market and some of the implications of that evolution 
for monetary policy and the economy.
The early decades of the twentieth century are a good starting point 
for this review, as urbanization and the exceptionally rapid popula-
tion growth of that period created a strong demand for new housing. 
Between 1890 and 1930, the number of housing units in the United 
States grew from about 10 million to about 30 million; the pace of Opening Remarks  7
homebuilding was particularly brisk during the economic boom of 
the 1920s.
Remarkably, this rapid expansion of the housing stock took place 
despite limited sources of mortgage financing and typical lending 
terms that were far less attractive than those to which we are accus-
tomed today. Required down payments, usually about half of the 
home’s purchase price, excluded many households from the market. 
Also, by comparison with today’s standards, the duration of mort-
gage loans was short, usually ten years or less. A “balloon” payment 
at the end of the loan often created problems for borrowers.2
High interest rates on loans reflected the illiquidity and the essen-
tially unhedgeable interest rate risk and default risk associated with 
mortgages. Nationwide, the average spread between mortgage rates 
and high-grade corporate bond yields during the 1920s was about 
200 basis points, compared with about 50 basis points on average 
since the mid-1980s. The absence of a national capital market also 
produced significant regional disparities in borrowing costs. Hard as 
it may be to conceive today, rates on mortgage loans before World 
War I were at times as much as 2 to 4 percentage points higher in 
some parts of the country than in others, and even in 1930, regional 
differences in rates could be more than a full percentage point.3 
Despite the underdevelopment of the mortgage market, homeown-
ership rates rose steadily after the turn of the century. As would often 
be the case in the future, government policy provided some induce-
ment for homebuilding. When the federal income tax was introduced 
in 1913, it included an exemption for mortgage interest payments, a 
provision that is a powerful stimulus to housing demand even today. 
By 1930, about 46 percent of nonfarm households owned their own 
homes, up from about 37 percent in 1890.
The limited availability of data prior to 1929 makes it hard to 
quantify the role of housing in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism during the early twentieth century. Comparisons are also 
complicated by great differences between then and now in mone-
tary policy frameworks and tools. Still, then as now, periods of tight 
money were reflected in higher interest rates and a greater reluctance 8  Ben S. Bernanke
of banks to lend, which affected conditions in mortgage markets. 
Moreover, students of the business cycle, such as Arthur Burns and 
Wesley  Mitchell,  have  observed  that  residential  construction  was 
highly cyclical and contributed significantly to fluctuations in the 
overall economy (Burns and Mitchell, 1946). Indeed, if we take the 
somewhat less reliable data for 1901 to 1929 at face value, real hous-
ing investment was about three times as volatile during that era as it 
has been over the past half-century.
During the past century we have seen two great sea changes in the 
market for housing finance. The first of these was the product of the 
New Deal. The second arose from financial innovation and a series 
of crises from the 1960s to the mid-1980s in depository funding of 
mortgages. I will turn first to the New Deal period.
The New Deal and the Housing Market
The housing sector, like the rest of the economy, was profoundly 
affected by the Great Depression. When Franklin Roosevelt took 
office in 1933, almost 10 percent of all homes were in foreclosure 
(Green and Wachter, 2005), construction employment had fallen 
by half from its late 1920s peak, and a banking system near col-
lapse was providing little new credit. As in other sectors, New Deal 
reforms in housing and housing finance aimed to foster economic 
revival through government programs that either provided financing 
directly or strengthened the institutional and regulatory structure of 
private credit markets.
Actually, one of the first steps in this direction was taken not by 
Roosevelt but by his predecessor, Herbert Hoover, who oversaw the 
creation of the Federal Home Loan Banking System in 1932. This 
measure reorganized the thrift industry (savings and loans and mu-
tual savings banks) under federally chartered associations and estab-
lished a credit reserve system modeled after the Federal Reserve. The 
Roosevelt administration pushed this and other programs affecting 
housing finance much further. In 1934, his administration oversaw 
the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). By pro-
viding a federally backed insurance system for mortgage lenders, the 
FHA was designed to encourage lenders to offer mortgages on more Opening Remarks  9
attractive terms. This intervention appears to have worked in that, 
by the 1950s, most new mortgages were for thirty years at fixed rates, 
and down payment requirements had fallen to about 20 percent. In 
1938, the Congress chartered the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation, or Fannie Mae, as it came to be known. The new institution 
was authorized to issue bonds and use the proceeds to purchase FHA 
mortgages from lenders, with the objectives of increasing the supply 
of mortgage credit and reducing variations in the terms and supply 
of credit across regions.4
Shaped to a considerable extent by New Deal reforms and regula-
tions, the postwar mortgage market took on the form that would 
last for several decades. The market had two main sectors. One, the 
descendant of the pre-Depression market sector, consisted of savings 
and loan associations; mutual savings banks; and, to a lesser extent, 
commercial banks. With financing from short-term deposits, these 
institutions made conventional fixed-rate, long-term loans to home-
buyers. Notably, federal and state regulations limited geographical 
diversification for these lenders, restricting interstate banking and 
obliging thrifts to make mortgage loans in small local areas—within 
50 miles of the home office until 1964, and within 100 miles after 
that. In the other sector, the product of New Deal programs, private 
mortgage brokers and other lenders originated standardized loans 
backed by the FHA and the Veterans’ Administration (VA). These 
guaranteed loans could be held in portfolio or sold to institutional 
investors through a nationwide secondary market.
No discussion of the New Deal’s effect on the housing market and 
the monetary transmission mechanism would be complete without 
reference to Regulation Q—which was eventually to exemplify the 
law of unintended consequences. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 
1935 gave the Federal Reserve the authority to impose deposit-rate 
ceilings on banks, an authority that was later expanded to cover thrift 
institutions. The Fed used this authority in establishing its Regula-
tion Q. The so-called Reg Q ceilings remained in place in one form 
or another until the mid-1980s.5
The original rationale for deposit ceilings was to reduce “exces-
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of bank failures in the early 1930s. In retrospect, of course, this was 
a dubious bit of economic analysis. In any case, the principal effects 
of the ceilings were not on bank competition but on the supply of 
credit. With the ceilings in place, banks and thrifts experienced what 
came to be known as disintermediation—an outflow of funds from 
depositories that occurred whenever short-term money-market rates 
rose above the maximum that these institutions could pay. In the 
absence of alternative funding sources, the loss of deposits prevented 
banks and thrifts from extending mortgage credit to new customers.
The Transmission Mechanism and the New Deal Reforms
Under the New Deal system, housing construction soared after 
World War II, driven by the removal of wartime building restrictions, 
the need to replace an aging housing stock, rapid family formation 
that accompanied the beginning of the baby boom, and large-scale 
internal migration. The stock of housing units grew 20 percent be-
tween 1940 and 1950, with most of the new construction occurring 
after 1945.
In 1951, the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord freed the Fed from 
the obligation to support Treasury bond prices. Monetary policy be-
gan to focus on influencing short-term money markets as a means of 
affecting economic activity and inflation, foreshadowing the Federal 
Reserve’s current use of the federal funds rate as a policy instrument. 
Over the next few decades, housing assumed a leading role in the 
monetary transmission mechanism, largely for two reasons: Reg Q 
and the advent of high inflation.
The Reg Q ceilings were seldom binding before the mid-1960s, 
but disintermediation induced by the ceilings occurred episodically 
from the mid-1960s until Reg Q began to be phased out aggressively 
in the early 1980s. The impact of disintermediation on the housing 
market could be quite significant; for example, a moderate tighten-
ing of monetary policy in 1966 contributed to a 23 percent decline 
in residential construction between the first quarter of 1966 and the 
first quarter of 1967. State usury laws and branching restrictions 
worsened the episodes of disintermediation by placing ceilings on 
lending rates and limiting the flow of funds between local markets. Opening Remarks  11
For the period 1960 to 1982, when Reg Q assumed its greatest im-
portance, statistical analysis shows a high correlation between single-
family housing starts and the growth of small time deposits at thrifts, 
suggesting that disintermediation effects were powerful; in contrast, 
since 1983 this correlation is essentially zero.6
Economists  at  the  time  were  well  aware  of  the  importance  of 
the disintermediation phenomenon for monetary policy. Frank de 
Leeuw and Edward Gramlich highlighted this particular channel in 
their description of an early version of the MPS macroeconometric 
model, a joint product of researchers at the Federal Reserve, MIT, 
and the University of Pennsylvania (de Leeuw and Gramlich, 1969). 
The model attributed almost one-half of the direct first-year effects 
of monetary policy on the real economy—which were estimated to 
be substantial—to disintermediation and other housing-related fac-
tors, despite the fact that residential construction accounted for only 
4 percent of nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at the time. 
As time went on, however, monetary policy mistakes and weaknesses 
in the structure of the mortgage market combined to create deeper 
economic problems. For reasons that have been much analyzed, in 
the late 1960s and the 1970s the Federal Reserve allowed inflation to 
rise, which led to corresponding increases in nominal interest rates. 
Increases in short-term nominal rates not matched by contractually 
set rates on existing mortgages exposed a fundamental weakness in the 
system of housing finance, namely, the maturity mismatch between 
long-term mortgage credit and the short-term deposits that commer-
cial banks and thrifts used to finance mortgage lending. This mismatch 
led to a series of liquidity crises and, ultimately, to a rash of insolvencies 
among mortgage lenders. High inflation was also ultimately reflected 
in high nominal long-term rates on new mortgages, which had the 
effect of “front-loading” the real payments made by holders of long-
term, fixed-rate mortgages. This front-loading reduced affordability 
and further limited the extension of mortgage credit, thereby restrain-
ing construction activity. Reflecting these factors, housing construc-
tion experienced a series of pronounced boom and bust cycles from 
the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, which contributed in turn to 
substantial swings in overall economic growth.12  Ben S. Bernanke
The Emergence of Capital Markets as a Source of Housing Finance
The manifest problems associated with relying on short-term de-
posits to fund long-term mortgage lending set in train major changes 
in financial markets and financial instruments, which collectively 
served to link mortgage lending more closely to the broader capital 
markets. The shift from reliance on specialized portfolio lenders fi-
nanced by deposits to a greater use of capital markets represented the 
second great sea change in mortgage finance, equaled in importance 
only by the events of the New Deal.
Government actions had considerable influence in shaping this 
second revolution. In 1968, Fannie Mae was split into two agen-
cies: the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) 
and the re-chartered Fannie Mae, which became a privately owned 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), authorized to operate in 
the secondary market for conventional as well as guaranteed mort-
gage loans. In 1970, to compete with Fannie Mae in the secondary 
market, another GSE was created—the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation, or Freddie Mac. Also in 1970, Ginnie Mae issued 
the first mortgage pass-through security, followed soon after by Fred-
die Mac. In the early 1980s, Freddie Mac introduced collateralized 
mortgage obligations (CMOs), which separated the payments from a 
pooled set of mortgages into “strips” carrying different effective ma-
turities and credit risks. Since 1980, the outstanding volume of GSE 
mortgage-backed securities has risen from less than $200 billion to 
more than $4 trillion today. Alongside these developments came the 
establishment of private mortgage insurers, which competed with the 
FHA, and private mortgage pools, which bundled loans not han-
dled by the GSEs, including loans that did not meet GSE eligibility 
criteria—so-called nonconforming loans. Today, these private pools 
account for around $2 trillion in residential mortgage debt.
These developments did not occur in time to prevent a large frac-
tion of the thrift industry from becoming effectively insolvent by the 
early 1980s in the wake of the late-1970s surge in inflation.7 In this 
instance, the government abandoned attempts to patch up the sys-
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out during the 1980s; state usury laws capping mortgage rates were 
abolished; restrictions on interstate banking were lifted by the mid-
1990s; and lenders were permitted to offer adjustable-rate mortgages 
as well as mortgages that did not fully amortize and which therefore 
involved balloon payments at the end of the loan period. Critically, 
the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s ended the dominance 
of deposit-taking portfolio lenders in the mortgage market. By the 
1990s, increased reliance on securitization led to a greater separation 
between mortgage lending and mortgage investing even as the mort-
gage and capital markets became more closely integrated. About 56 
percent of the home mortgage market is now securitized, compared 
with only 10 percent in 1980 and less than 1 percent in 1970.
In some ways, the new mortgage market came to look more like 
a textbook financial market, with fewer institutional “frictions” to 
impede trading and pricing of event-contingent securities. Securiti-
zation and the development of deep and liquid derivatives markets 
eased the spreading and trading of risk. New types of mortgage prod-
ucts were created. Recent developments notwithstanding, mortgages 
became more liquid instruments, for both lenders and borrowers. 
Technological advances facilitated these changes; for example, com-
puterization and innovations such as credit scores reduced the costs of 
making loans and led to a “commoditization” of mortgages. Access to 
mortgage credit also widened; notably, loans to subprime borrowers 
accounted for about 13 percent of outstanding mortgages in 2006.
I suggested that the mortgage market has become more like the 
frictionless financial market of the textbook, with fewer institutional 
or regulatory barriers to efficient operation. In one important re-
spect, however, that characterization is not entirely accurate. A key 
function of efficient capital markets is to overcome problems of in-
formation and incentives in the extension of credit. The traditional 
model of mortgage markets, based on portfolio lending, solved these 
problems in a straightforward way: Because banks and thrifts kept 
the loans they made on their own books, they had strong incen-
tives to underwrite carefully and to invest in gathering information 
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securitized and originators have little financial or reputational capi-
tal at risk, the danger exists that the originators of loans will be less 
diligent. In securitization markets, therefore, monitoring the origi-
nators and ensuring that they have incentives to make good loans 
is critical. I have argued elsewhere that, in some cases, the failure of 
investors to provide adequate oversight of originators and to ensure 
that originators’ incentives were properly aligned was a major cause 
of the problems that we see today in the subprime mortgage market 
(Bernanke, 2007). In recent months we have seen a reassessment of 
the problems of maintaining adequate monitoring and incentives in 
the lending process, with investors insisting on tighter underwrit-
ing standards and some large lenders pulling back from the use of 
brokers and other agents. We will not return to the days in which all 
mortgage lending was portfolio lending, but clearly the originate-to-
distribute model will be modified—is already being modified—to 
provide stronger protection for investors and better incentives for 
originators to underwrite prudently.
The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Since the Mid-1980s
The dramatic changes in mortgage finance that I have described 
appear to have significantly affected the role of housing in the mon-
etary transmission mechanism. Importantly, the easing of some tra-
ditional institutional and regulatory frictions seems to have reduced 
the sensitivity of residential construction to monetary policy, so that 
housing is no longer so central to monetary transmission as it was.8  
In particular, in the absence of Reg Q ceilings on deposit rates and 
with a much-reduced role for deposits as a source of housing finance, 
the availability of mortgage credit today is generally less dependent 
on conditions in short-term money markets, where the central bank 
operates most directly.
Most estimates suggest that, because of the reduced sensitivity of 
housing to short-term interest rates, the response of the economy to 
a given change in the federal funds rate is modestly smaller and more 
balanced across sectors than in the past.9 These results are embodied 
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which implies that only about 14 percent of the overall response of 
output to monetary policy is now attributable to movements in resi-
dential investment, in contrast to the model’s estimate of 25 percent 
or so under what I have called the New Deal system.
The econometric findings seem consistent with the reduced syn-
chronization of the housing cycle and the business cycle during the 
present decade. In all but one recession during the period from 1960 
to 1999, declines in residential investment accounted for at least 40 
percent of the decline in overall real GDP, and the sole exception—
the 1970 recession—was preceded by a substantial decline in hous-
ing activity before the official start of the downturn. In contrast, resi-
dential investment boosted overall real GDP growth during the 2001 
recession. More recently, the sharp slowdown in housing has been ac-
companied, at least thus far, by relatively good performance in other 
sectors. That said, the current episode demonstrates that pronounced 
housing cycles are not a thing of the past.
My discussion so far has focused primarily on the role of varia-
tions in housing finance and residential construction in monetary 
transmission. But, of course, housing may have indirect effects on 
economic activity, most notably by influencing consumer spending. 
With regard to household consumption, perhaps the most signifi-
cant effect of recent developments in mortgage finance is that home 
equity, which was once a highly illiquid asset, has become instead 
quite liquid, the result of the development of home equity lines of 
credit and the relatively low cost of cash-out refinancing. Economic 
theory suggests that the greater liquidity of home equity should allow 
households to better smooth consumption over time. This smooth-
ing in turn should reduce the dependence of their spending on cur-
rent income, which, by limiting the power of conventional multiplier 
effects, should tend to increase macroeconomic stability and reduce 
the effects of a given change in the short-term interest rate. These 
inferences are supported by some empirical evidence.10
On the other hand, the increased liquidity of home equity may lead 
consumer spending to respond more than in past years to changes in 
the values of their homes; some evidence does suggest that the cor-
relation of consumption and house prices is higher in countries, like 16  Ben S. Bernanke
the United States, that have more sophisticated mortgage markets 
(Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 2007). Whether the development of 
home equity loans and easier mortgage refinancing has increased the 
magnitude of the real estate wealth effect—and if so, by how much—
is a much-debated question that I will leave to another occasion.
Conclusion
I hope this exploration of the history of housing finance has per-
suaded you that institutional factors can matter quite a bit in deter-
mining the influence of monetary policy on housing and the role of 
housing in the business cycle. Certainly, recent developments have 
added yet further evidence in support of that proposition. The in-
teraction of housing, housing finance, and economic activity has for 
years been of central importance for understanding the behavior of 
the economy, and it will continue to be central to our thinking as we 
try to anticipate economic and financial developments.
In closing, I would like to express my particular appreciation for 
an individual whom I count as a friend, as I know many of you do:   
Edward Gramlich. Ned was scheduled to be on the program but his 
illness prevented him from making the trip. As many of you know, 
Ned has been a research leader in the topics we are discussing this 
weekend, and he has just finished a very interesting book on sub-
prime mortgage markets. We will miss not only Ned’s insights over 
the course of this conference but his warmth and wit as well. Ned 
and his wife, Ruth, will be in the thoughts of all of us.Opening Remarks  17
Endnotes
1Estimates of delinquencies are based on data from First American LoanPerformance.
2Weiss (1989) provides an overview of the evolution of mortgage lending over 
the past 100 years. 
3Snowden (1987) discusses regional variations in home mortgage rates at the end 
of the nineteenth century. In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce (1937) 
provides information on mortgage rates for various U.S. cities for the 1920s and 
early 1930s.
4Later, in anticipation of the end of World War II, the Congress created the 
Veterans’ Administration (VA) Home Loan Guarantee Program, which supported 
mortgage lending to returning GIs on attractive terms, often including little or 
no down-payment requirement. In 1948, the Congress authorized Fannie Mae to 
purchase these VA loans as well. 
5Regulation Q provisions that still exist restrict banks’ ability to pay interest on 
some deposits, but these remaining provisions have little effect on the ability of 
depository institutions to raise funds. 
6In detrended data, the correlation between quarterly single-family housing starts 
and the growth of small time deposits at thrifts during the preceding quarter was 
0.53 for the 1960-1982 period; since 1983, this correlation has fallen to -0.02. 
7Mahoney and White (1985) reported that the net worth of 156 thrift insti-
tutions was less than 1 percent of assets in 1984; when reported net worth was 
adjusted to exclude regulatory additions that did not represent true capital, this 
figure swelled to 253. 
8Institutional factors can still be relevant, however, as can be seen by internation-
al comparisons. For example, in the United Kingdom, where the predominance 
of adjustable-rate mortgages makes changes in short-term interest rates quite vis-
ible to borrowers and homeowners, housing has a significant role in the monetary 
transmission mechanism through cash-flow effects on consumption, among other 
channels (Benito, Thompson, Waldron, and Wood, 2006). Although adjustable-
rate mortgages have become more important in the United States and now account 
for about 40 percent of the market, most adjustable-rate mortgages here are actu-
ally hybrids in that they bear a fixed rate for the first several years of the loan. 
9For example, McCarthy and Peach (2002) report a substantial decline in the 
short-run, though not long-run, interest elasticity of residential investment and 
real GDP after the early 1980s. Work by Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) 
supports this conclusion as does other work at the Federal Reserve on models for 
forecasting residential investment. Modeling work at the Fed also shows that the 
short-run sensitivity of residential investment to nominal mortgage rates fell by 
more than half after the end of the New Deal system, but, in line with the findings 18  Ben S. Bernanke
of McCarthy and Peach, remained largely static after 1982. Estrella (2002) finds 
that secular changes in mortgage securitization have reduced the interest sensitivity 
of housing to short-term interest rates and the response of real output to an unan-
ticipated change in monetary policy. 
10Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) argue that financial innovation has made 
it easier for households to use the equity in their homes to buffer their spending 
against income shocks, thereby reducing the volatility of aggregate consumption. 
Studies by Hurst and Stafford (2004) and Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001) 
provide indirect evidence supporting this argument.Opening Remarks  19
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